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FACT AND FICTION CONCERNING
MULTINATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
John C. Shearer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Interest and speculation concerning multinational labor relations have increased rapidly over recent years, reflecting the tremendous growth in prominence of the multinational corporation
(MNC). The MNC has become the central economic institution in
the conduct not only of the transnational, but also of the domestic
business of many nations. Although MNCs have many different
home countries, those based in the United States dominate the
scene and will be the focus of our concern here.
This article briefly reviews the magnitude, nature, and growth
of the foreign investments of American-based MNCs, especially
those in the nine member countries of the European Community
(EC), and summarizes the major union fears and aspirations that
arise from the rapid growth in scope and power of MNCs. The
article focuses on the realities and fantasies surrounding the prospects for multinational collective bargaining with MNCs, which is
widely viewed as the most feasible means by which unions can
protect their vital interests threatened by MNCs. Unfortunately,
in discussions of this matter considerable fiction is often mixed
with fact. Some observers see international unionism and multinational collective bargaining as natural concommitants of the internationalization of production and product markets through the
spread of MNCs, and they view these developments as the transnational extension of the phenomenon that has characterized the
evolution of domestic union structures in response to the national
widening of production and of product markets. In their fascina* Professor of Economics and Director, Manpower Research & Training Center, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma; B.S., Cornell University,
1952, A.M., Princeton University, 1958; Ph.D., Princeton University, 1960.
1. The member countries of the European Community are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom. The designation "European Community" (EC) will be utilized
to conform to recent usage which reflects the amalgamation of the European
Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community, and
the European Atomic Energy Community. The other designation, "EEC," also
appears in some quotations and references.

52

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10: 51

tion with the bold notion of the internationalization of collective
bargaining it is tempting for commentators to allow abstract ideas
and aspirations to prevail over realities.
As background, the discussion includes a brief description of
how American-based MNCs structure and manage their overseas
labor relations policies and practices, the nature of the American
industrial relations environment in which they operate, and the
considerable differences in the industrial relations environments in
the EC countries. The article concludes with a discussion of the
union responses, both international and domestic, to the MNCs
and, finally, with the effects of recent EC developments on the
prospects for multinational collective bargaining there.
II.

MAGNITUDE, NATURE, AND GROWTH OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS OF

AMERICAN-BASED

MNCs

The immensity of investments abroad by United States firms is
shown by data for the end of 1974, the latest available.2 Investments in the nine member countries of the EC account for almost
30 per cent of the total; approximately 60 per cent of the investment in the EC is in manufacturing. Of these nine member countries the United Kingdom hosts 10.5 per cent and Germany 6.7 per
cent of all American direct foreign investment. The growth of these
investments has been impressive. Since 1958 total United States
direct foreign investments have risen more than fourfold, and there
has been a tenfold increase in Europe. The value of the investments by American MNCs in the United Kingdom is now more
than six times, and in Germany almost fourteen times, the 1958
figure.'
The economic power of MNCs is widely regarded as awesome.
Charles Levinson, Secretary-General of the International Federation of Chemical and General Workers' Unions, using 1969 data,
points out that, based on countries' gross national products and on
the annual sales of MNCs, among the top 100 countries and enterprises combined, 54 were MNCs and only 46 were countries. Of
these largest MNCs, 35 were based in the United States. 4 Without
doubt, the growth of the MNCs represents one of the most important phenomena in economic history. The transnational implicaSURVEY CURRENT Bus., Oct. 1975, Table 13, at 53.
3. Pizer & Culter, Capital Flow to Foreign Countries Slackens, SURVEY
RENT Bus., Aug. 1959, Table 2, at 30.

2.

4.

CUR-

C. LEVINSON, CAPITAL, INFLATION, AND THE MULTINATIONALS 146-49 (1971).
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tions of their power, without transnational responsibility, have
evoked considerable concern and study by national and international organizations and have been especially worrisome to unions.
I.

VALIDITY OF UNION FEARS

Union fears fall into two general categories: (1) fears by homecountry unions of the loss of jobs through the establishment or
expansion by MNCs of production abroad, especially in lowerwage countries; and (2) fears about the weakening of the economic
power of unions through the increasingly wide dispersion throughout the world of investments by MNCs. The first of these fears is
the transnational version of the "runaway shop" problem that has
long been of intense concern to unions. In the international context
the problem is viewed as much more menacing because of the
complete absence of international counterparts of domestic controls, by law or by collective bargaining agreements, on corporate
investment policies. The second fear, that of weakening economic
power, has three major dimensions. First, the very fact of widespread international operations dilutes considerably the economic
pressure that any union can bring to bear on a MNC because union
jurisdiction, even if national, covers only a portion, and perhaps
only a small portion, of the total operations of the firm. Secondly,
there exists the threat, express or implied, of the transfer to another country of facilities from a country where a strike is under
way or is imminent. Lastly, MNCs have the opportunity, by importing production from their overseas operations, to maintain
domestic sales during a strike.
A.

Loss of Jobs

The various union apprehensions concerning the increasing
scope and power of MNCs have widely varying factual bases. The
first of these fears, the loss of home-country union jobs through the
expansion by MNCs of production abroad, has the most substantial basis, especially where United States unions are concerned.
Among the noteworthy examples usually cited are the consumer
electronics industry, the clothing industry and the automotive industry. Although reliable data are not available, it is clear that in
these and in many other industries there has been substantially
less employment in the United States as a result of the overseas
operations of United States-based MNCs. These reductions in
United States employment may result directly from the transfer
abroad of production operations formerly performed in the United
States, or indirectly through expansion of world-wide production

54

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[.

10.:51

abroad rather than in the United States. In many major instances,
United States industries, such as consumer electronics and automobiles, that formerly exported considerable quantities of their
output have now become major importers, often importing from
the overseas plants of United States-based MNCs.
The major union in the radio, television, and electronics components field, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE), claims that approximately 100,000
jobs-about 20 per cent of United States employment in those
fields-have been transferred out of the country by United Statesbased MNCs. This transfer has been mainly to their newly established plants in Asia and Latin America.' Especially noteworthy
are the "border plants" operated by United States firms in Mexico.
These and other overseas operations are encouraged by Item 807
of the United States Tariff Schedules, which allows United States
manufacturers to ship components abroad for assembly in low
wage plants and then to import the finished products, paying duty
only on the value added-the low-cost labor performed abroad.
According to the International Ladies Garment Workers Union,
United States employment in the garment industry has been reduced by 250,000 jobs because of imports during the past fifteen
years. Over the past decade the proportion of imported garments
has risen from one in twenty to one in every four. Although most
of these imports are from foreign firms, an increasing quantity is
accounted for by United States-based MNCs. Efforts by the needle
trades unions to have Item 807 repealed or modified has resulted
in the recent threat by one garment manufacturer, Warnaco, Inc.,
to move all of its production activities abroad if this provision of
the United States Tariff Schedules is repealed.'
The United States automotive industry offers a significant example of a metamorphosis in its international posture. Historically, the United States industry was a heavy net exporter, and its
principle union, the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), was, consequently,
a major proponent of liberalized trade policies. As the tide of imported automobiles increased and the United States became a
heavy net importer, the position of the UAW shifted to reflect the
5. D. Benedict, Labour and the Multinationals (May 27, 1976) (paper presented at the International Conference on Trends in Industrial and Labour Relations, Montreal).
6. Yeager, Garment Union Tries to Save the Industry (and Also Its Jobs),
Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1976, at 20, col. 1.
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threat thus posed to United States employment in the industry. As
the overseas operations of American automobile companies increased, as their overseas production became a significant proportion of these imports, and as "world-wide sourcing" of components
for assembly in any country became widespread, the UAW,
through the coordination of world-wide union efforts in the industry to mount an international response to the MNCs, became a
leader in efforts to meet the challenges posed by MNCs.
B.

Weakening of Economic Power

The three other major union fears pertain to the weakening of
union power through the increasing world-wide dispersion of the
operations of MNCs. Only the first of these, the dilution of the
power of a national union through the proportionate reduction of
total MNC operations under its jurisdiction, has any substantial
basis in fact. Prior to World War I only a few United States-based
firms, such as Singer and National Cash Register, conducted major
portions of their business abroad. Today, the list has grown to
encompass all but a very few of our major corporations. Consequently, the influence which even a strongly entrenched domestic
union has on the totality of corporate activity is necessarily reduced.
The last two fears relate to the additional power MNCs have to
combat strikes in any one country. The first involves the threat of
the MNC transferring its operations to another country. The most
cited example is the alleged threat by Henry Ford II in 1971 to
meet continuing labor-management strife in the company's British
operations by transferring investment and production to Germany.
Despite continuation of a high level of strife, characterized by
frequent and widespread wildcat stikes, the company has made no
such move. Furthermore, this writer has been unable to find any
documented instance of the actual employment of this tactic by
any United States-based MNC. This is not surprising in light of
the tremendous costs involved in closing down an operation in one
country and opening a similar facility in another. Even if the unions and the government of the first country did not impede the
transfer of the machinery and inventories, the capital costs involved would vastly exceed the costs of strikes, except under the
most unusual circumstances. In short, economic realities make it
most unlikely that MNCs would transfer investments to another
country to undercut strikes.
The second strike-breaking technique, the use of imports from
overseas operations to maintain domestic sales, should give unions
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greater cause for concern. The direct costs of the international
transfer of products are insignificant as compared to the tremendous costs of transferring productive facilities. Even if import duties and additional transportation costs were to reduce or eliminate
profits on the resulting sales, firms might find in this technique a
relatively easy and inexpensive way to undercut strikes. United
States international trade legislation contains no escape provision
or other relief for a union whose strike position or bargaining position is weakened by such imports. 7 Despite the economic feasibility
of doing so, the writer has found no documented instance of a
United States-based MNC using imports from its overseas operations to undercut a strike in its American operations. The reluctance of MNCs to use this readily available and potentially powerful weapon probably reflects their recognition of the considerable
risks of such an action. The use of foreign products to undercut the
position of American workers would probably cause a sensation in
the United States and result in considerable public support for the
strikers. Firms also may recognize the strong possibility that
United States waterfront unions would refuse to handle strikebreaking imports. These unionists are even more likely to support
a strike by fellow unionists than they were to support the American
consumer by their illegal, but very effective, refusal in 1975 to load
grain for sale to the Soviet Union.
Strike-breaking imports would surely stimulate unions to solidify their common defensive efforts against such moves. In the short
run this could lead to refusals by overseas unions to permit the
international shipments of strike-breaking products. Such refusals
might develop into chain reaction strikes in overseas operations. In
the long run, the rallying of unions' efforts for stronger cooperation
and organization along international lines would create an unappealing prospect for MNCs. Although it is unlikely that MNCs
would import production from abroad to undercut domestic
strikes, United States unions could reduce the possibility still further if they could attain an appropriate prohibition in our international trade legislation. Such a'protection would be consistent with
the protection for union standards and interests which, over many
years, have been successfully lobbied into much domestic legislation.
The major threat to unions posed by MNCs is their investment
decisions, which often have profound effects on employment op7.

Trade Act of 1974, P. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
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portunities. In the absence of any supra-national constraints, these
investment decisions reflect only corporate interests, which may be
inimical to the interests of the unions affected. Accordingly, unions
have sought to organize to protect themselves against the increasing power which MNCs have over the employment opportunities
of union members throughout the world. For American unions,
collective bargaining has been the most effective means for protecting and expanding labor's interests with respect to domestic
firms. Consequently, American unions have led efforts toward internationalization of collective bargaining to protect and expand
labor's interests with respect to MNCs. However natural this move
may be, it contains at least one serious conceptual flaw. Although
collective bargaining has been very effective in improving wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment in the
United States, it has had little direct influence on domestic investment and production decisions. It is interesting to speculate
whether, even if international collective bargaining with MNCs
were attained, unions could influence international investment
decisions more effectively than they have influenced domestic investment decisions.
IV.

LABOR RELATIONS STRUCTURE OF

MNCs

The evidence is clear that, among the many activities of MNCs,
the area of industrial and labor relations constitutes one of the
most decentralized, or nationally oriented, of management functions. This reflects the peculiar identity of MNCs and the strong
preferences of their managements, in part the result of the multinational nature of the enterprises. MNCs have no legal status.
They are groups of corporations, subsidiary to a parent corporation, all of which are established and have their legal identities
under the laws of their individual countries. Therefore, each subsidiary must operate as a domestic corporation within the host
country, subject to all the laws of that country but to no other
regulation. In the labor relations field, since each subsidiary of a
particular MNC is a national company, it must abide by all national labor laws, which are often quite distinct from the labor relations legislation governing sister subsidiaries of the same MNC
in other countries. Consequently, even if top management of a
MNC preferred to centralize its labor relations functions, it would
be impossible to do so to any great extent.
Within the constraining legal limits, the propensity of parent
organizations to intervene in the industrial relations activities of
their subsidiaries varies according to technological and market fac-
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tors. The tendency is generally greater where a particular subsidiary is a "key" plant in an integrated production system, as is often
true in the automotive industry. The increasing use of "world-wide
sourcing," whereby parts of components are produced in certain
subsidiaries for use in other countries, necessarily increases the
concern of home offices over the extensive disruption throughout
the integrated production systems that would result from a strike
in any one subsidiary. In contrast, in the many MNCs which have
very decentralized production and marketing operations, such as
those in the food industry, there is much less concern about the
overall effects of labor relations and strikes in any one subsidiary.'
No firm can operate without accommodating the particular institutions, customs, and attitudes of its environment. The great
differences among countries in these and other relevant respects,
together with the legal variations that these differences reinforce,
have persuaded MNCs to keep their labor relations structures and
functions decentralized. The standard management view was expressed by Malcolm Denise, Vice-President for Industrial Relations of the Ford Motor Company:
One fundamental factor has emerged most manifestly from the Ford
experience in dealing with industrial relations in a multinational
context: each country has its own unique institutions, legal framework, customs, historical background, attitudes, and expectations
which provide the framework in which employee and union relations
are conducted. One can try to alter these factors, but one cannot
escape the fact that they are there and that they are relevant to what
is undertaken and to what is achieved.9
Studies by international organizations have documented the
considerable decentralization of policy-making and practice in
labor relations,' 0 as have academic studies of the matter." A recent
8. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, MULTINATIONALS IN WESTERN EUROPE: THE
INDUSTRJAL RELATIONS EXPERIENCE 26 (1976).

9. Denise, IndustrialRelations and the Multinational Corporation:The Ford
Experience, in BARGAINING WITHOUT BOUNDARIES: THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 137 (R.Flanagan & A. Weber, eds.
1974). See also the discussion by an Exxon official, J.M. Rosow, IndustrialRela-

tions and the Multinational Corporation: The Management Approach, in
Flanagan & Weber, supra at 147-67.

10. K. WALKER, LABOUR PROBLEMS IN MULTINATIONAL FIRMS: REPORT ON A
MEETING OF MANAGEMENT EXPERTS 5 (1972).
11. See, e.g., D. KUJAWA, INTERNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MANAGEMENT IN THE
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

(1971).

MULTINATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

Winter 1977]

study by the International Labour Office based on extensive interviews with company and union officials in six Western European
countries confirms the considerable localization within MNCs of
the determination of industrial and labor relations matters, "with
the possible exception of one or two items such as pensions."' 2
Decentralized labor relations means that the MNCs' subsidiaries in each nation, rather than the parent organizations, have the
major decision-making power in such key matters as whether to
recognize and deal with unions, whether to join employers' organizations for collective bargaining purposes, what matters to discuss
and bargain with unions, what wage systems and structures to
employ, how to handle disputes and the terms of settlement, and
what trade-offs to make between concessions and strikes. As discussed below, this decentralization provides the headquarters
managements of MNCs with pragmatic justification for their consistent refusals to discuss with unions the top-level matters determined by their subsidiaries.
V.

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS ENVIRONMENTS

A.

The United States Environment

Our concern here is limited to industrial unions, those which
seek to organize and bargain for all occupations, whatever the
nature and level of their skill, within a specified industry. Although a few unions, such as the United Mine Workers of America,
had always been organized along these lines, the main development of industrial unionism took place in the 1930s. The strong
opposition by most major craft unions led to the expulsion from the
American Federation of Labor of the industrial unions, which then
federated loosely into the Congress of Industrial Organizations
until reunification of the two federations in 1955 as the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations.
Throughout the history of American unions, each national
("international") union, whether craft or industrial, has been autonomous and has sought exclusive jurisdiction over its craft or
industry. Industrial unions have achieved a considerable measure
of success through mergers or no-raiding agreements between rival
unions, which have been encouraged by the federations. Major
unions, however, have usually operated without federation affilia-

12.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 8, at 53.
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tion either by choice (e.g., the United Automobile Workers) or by
expulsion (e.g., the Teamsters-the nation's largest union). The
Teamsters and some other unions actively organize with little regard for the jurisdictions of rival unions.
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 established the
ground rules for collective bargaining. It set up procedures under
which an employer would be obligated to recognize and bargain
with unions in good faith on "wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment." It also protects the rights of unions to
organize and deal with employers through the specification of a
series of unfair labor practices that are prohibited to employers.
Subsequent modifications, especially by the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, have sought to balance, but have not substantially diluted, the firm legal basis for union recognition-the
obligation of employers to bargain in good faith and the principle
of exclusive representation. Union recognition, whether voluntary
by the employer or compelled by National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) procedures, confers upon the union exclusive rights to
represent and to bargain for all workers in the appropriate bargaining unit; that is, all the occupations covered by the employer's
recognition or by certification by the NLRB. This exclusive jurisdiction carries with it the obligation to represent, equally, members of the bargaining unit who are not union members.
The establishment of bargaining units (and consequently, the
scope of bargaining) has generally been at the plant level even for
multiplant enterprises. However, in some major industries, including the automotive, steel, electrical equipment, and rubber industries, bargaining on a company-wide basis has evolved. Only in a
few major industries, such as flat glass, have there ever been
industry-wide negotiations. Where there are company-wide or
industry-wide collective bargaining agreements, they are usually
supplemented by local agreements on appropriate matters.
Collective bargaining agreements typically cover a very wide
range of subjects. Often some form of union security (compulsory
union membership) is provided, a matter of utmost importance to
industrial unions. Wages are specified, usually by flat rates for
each of many occupations or groups of occupations. In those relatively few agreements that provide ranges of wage rates for particular occupations, the means of progression within the ranges (which
may be on the basis of time, ability, or a combination of these
factors) are carefully specified. Hours of work, overtime provisions,
and shift premiums are specified. Seniority plays a very important
role in most agreements, strongly influencing, or even governing,
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the allocation of a variety of scarce employment opportunities such
as promotions, transfers, demotions, layoffs, and recalls. A wide
range of benefits are provided, including vacations, holidays, sickness and accident insurance, and pensions. The wording of the
National Labor Relations Act and its administration by the NLRB
provide a wide latitude for the obligation to bargain, wherein the
initiative and imagination of the negotiators, rather than the law
and its administration, set most of the practical limits to the coverage of collective bargaining.
Agreements typically incorporate detailed provisions for the adjustment of grievances, and the grievance procedures in the vast
preponderance of agreements provide for binding arbitration as the
final step. Agreements almost always have specific expiration
dates and are legally binding upon both parties. They typically
include provisions wherein the unions renounce the right to strike
(except in a few agreements, over certain limited issues) for the
term of the agreement, during which time the employer also renounces the right to lock out the workers. Except for such contractual restrictions, both parties have wide latitude in their use of
economic weaponry to advance or to protect their interests.
B.

The European Environment

Although superficially there may seem to be many similarities
between the American and European industrial relations environments, the similarities may lead to a misunderstanding of the
fundamental and pervasive differences. 3 No attempt will be made
to summarize the major features of the industrial relations environments of each EC country. However, a few observations will
serve to illustrate the vast differences among the various industrial
relations environments in the United States and the EC.
13. For a detailed treatment of these differences, see Summers, Labor Relations and the Role of Law in Western Europe, in WESTERN EUROPEAN LABOR AND
THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 145 (A: Kamin ed. 1970). Also in Kamin, supra, see
Fairweather, Western European Labor Movements and Collective Bargaining-An InstitutionalFramework, at 59; Crijns, Collective Bargainingin Nations
of the EuropeanEconomic Community, at 93; Fano, The ItalianLaborMovement
and Collective Bargaining,at 99; Grunfeld, LaborRelations and the Role of Law
in Great Britain, at 149; Blanpain, Labor Relations in Belgium, at 209; Gamillscheg, Outlines of Collective Labor Law in the FederalRepublic of Germany,
at 253; McCartney, Ireland and Labour Relations Law, at 269. See also Shearer,
IndustrialRelations of American CorporationsAbroad, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR
109 (S. Barkin, et al., eds. 1967); Curtin, The Multinational Corporationand

TransnationalCollective Bargaining,in AmImcAN
CORPORATION 192 (D. Kujawa ed. 1973).

LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL
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Union structures vary greatly among the countries of the EC. In
the United Kingdom there are almost 600 unions (compared to less
than 200 in the United States), whereas in Belgium there are only
three. Both in France, which has four federations of unions, and
in Italy, which has three main federations, the largest such federations are communist controlled. 4
No EC country has legislation similar to the American National
Labor Relations Act. Although European employers have no legal
obligation to recognize and to bargain with unions, their willingness to do so reflects the ability of the unions to press for such
recognition by economic action against employers if needed. The
principle of exclusive bargaining rights, fundamental to American
labor relations, does not exist in Western Europe. A union represents only its members, and its collective bargaining agreements
apply only to those members. In the absence of either legal or
contractual provisions for union security, members are able to
leave their unions at will. Every employee is free to select his own
union or to bargain as an individual. The result, except in Germany where the labor movement is unified, is that an employer
may, with respect to a single category of employees, be confronted
by several competing unions with overlapping jurisdictions." This
multiplicity of competing and overlapping unions, each with its
own interests and demands, presents the American MNC with a
much more complex collective bargaining situation in Europe than
it confronts in the United States.
These features of European labor relations have profound implications for the prospects of international collective bargaining. The
absence of exclusive bargaining rights and the overlapping union
jurisdictions over specific occupational categories within a plant
complicates questions of who should represent European employees in any international collective bargaining, and who should be
responsible for their compliance with any resulting international
collective bargaining agreement. International collective bargaining carries with it the necessity for the subordination of some national union interest to the wider interests of an international
amalgamation of unions. The multiplicity of European unions in
specific jurisdictions, typically covered by only one United States
union, would complicate the difficult task of trying to harmonize
14. Fairweather, supra note 13, at 71-86.
15.

Summers, supra note 13, at 146. Ford Motor Company in the United

Kingdom deals with 21 different uhions. Copp, Negotiating a New Wage Structure at Ford of Britain, in Kamin, supra note 13, at 110.
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diverse national interests among employees of MNCs. In Europe,
the freedom of union members to leave their unions at will would
limit the ability of any European union to assume an internationalist position at variance with the immediate interests of its members. This powerful and direct influence by members on union
postures contrasts sharply with the more protected position enjoyed by United States unions through their exclusive bargaining
rights and union security provisions assuring continuity of membership. This contrast might mean that only United States unions
could take a long-run, statesman-like position regarding the formulation and execution of international collective bargaining policies. Such a disparity in the necessity of union response to the
short-run interests of its members poses very serious barriers to
international collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining in the EC countries generally takes place
at regional or national levels between coalitions of unions and associations of employers in each industry. These umbrella agreements, under the legal rule of extension of the collective agreement, may be made applicable by government action to those
parts of the entire industry that were not parties to the agreements.
This apparent unification exists, however, only at the national (or
regional) level and results in national collective bargaining agreements of limited importance. More significant collective bargaining takes place at provincial or at plant levels. At these levels,
"where terms and conditions are actually fixed, the problems of
multiple unionism remain real and the lack of an exclusive representative with which to deal alters the entire structure of labor
relations."'"
Differences in the geographic scope of bargaining in European
countries and the United States represent major obstacles to the
development of international collective bargaining. For example,
the basic bargaining of the German metalworkers' union with the
transnational automotive companies is done on a broad regional
basis with relevant employers' associations. Accordingly, this
union is not in a position to separate out subsidiary plants of a
particular multinational automobile company in order to realign
them for transnational bargaining with specific MNCs. 17
Although collective bargaining agreements in the United States
fix both the minimum and maximum wages and other terms of
16.

17.

Summers, supra note 13, at 18.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 8, at 45.
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employment, European agreements do not. Except in the Netherlands, collective agreements establish only minimum wages and
conditions, which are then varied upward by a bewildering variety
of local agreements and informal arrangements. The national
agreements are geared to the circumstances of the marginal firms
that are members of the employers association. The plant agreements then supplement the national agreements by improving
their minimum wages and conditions. In Italy, plant agreements
also set additional minimum wages and benefits for departmental
or trade groups within the plant. These groups can improve their
positions through their own bargaining. The individual worker
may then bargain to improve further his own situation."
According to Summers:
The most deceptive difference between European and American
collective bargaining is that in Europe collective bargaining is so
much more centralized in form, but so much less centralized in
substance. What first appears to be a highly integrated and nearly
monolithic system proves, upon closer examination, to be an atomistic arrangement with little or no cohesion. 9
A major consequence of this atomistic bargaining structure is
typified in the United Kingdom, where most matters of greatest
practical significance to union members are negotiated at the plant
or lower levels. This results in considerable independence and, not
infrequently, hostility between the shop stewards and the remote
union hierarchies." Such decentralization of power within unions,
which is not limited to the United Kingdom, further impedes prospects for international collective bargaining because it seriously
limits the ability of union officials to act independently of the
immediate short-run interests of their members.
The substance of collective bargaining is considerably narrower
in the EC countries than in the United States because in Europe
many of the matters appropriate to American negotiations are covered by law. Typically, legislation in the EC countries provides
comprehensive health insurance, maternity benefits, disability
insurance, old age benefits, survivors' benefits and family allowances. In many countries legislation extends to vacations, hours of
work, and generous termination allowances."'
18. Summers, supra note 13, at 149.
19. Id. at 150.
20. Fairweather, supra note 13, at 72.
21.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COUNSELORS, FACTS ON EUROPE 6-8 (1966).
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Each Western European country has developed unique plant
level structures for handling local disputes. Although these structures resemble American grievance committees, there are major
general differences. The local bodies (work councils) are, essentially, independent of the union hierarchies. Their members are
elected directly by all employees rather than by the unions. Each
member, therefore, is a direct representative of all employees
rather than a union functionary. The independence of work councils and of shop stewards from the official union structures contrasts sharply with the American situation. The base of American
union pyramids, the local unions, which typically negotiate and
administer comprehensive and definitive collective bargaining
agreements, simply does not exist in Europe.
The work councils, whose functions (as discussed below) are not
limited to administering the collective agreements, lack the orderly sequences of appeals which typify American grievance procedures. Disputes that cannot be settled seldom go to arbitration.
Instead, they go to specialized labor courts, as in Belgium, France,
and Germany, or to ordinary courts, as in Italy, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom. The alternative, which is the main recourse used by shop stewards in the last of these countries, is
economic force. No-strike, no-lockout clauses are not widely used;
however, to varying degrees, the law in the EC countries other than
the United Kingdom recognizes implied "peace obligations" of
various types in collective bargaining agreements."
Worker participation in management is an increasingly significant phenomenon in Europe, but is a concept that is rejected by
American union officialdom. In his address to the International
Conference on Trends in Industrial and Labour Relations in Montreal in May 1976, Thomas R. Donahue, Executive Assistant to
AFL-CIO President George Meany, stated that the concept of
worker participation in management "offers little to American unions in the performance of their job unionism role."
Worker participation in management, often designated as "industrial democracy," can be divided into two broad categories-advisory participation and codetermination. The former is
typified by joint consultation, which consists of a dialogue between
management and elected employee representatives (work councils)
concerning a broad range of management practices and plans. It
22.
23.

Summers, supra note 13, at 164-65.
AFL-CIO News, June 12, 1976, at 8, col. 1.
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is required by law in Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. In the
United Kingdom it is required in the nationalized industries, but
has been common in the private sector since the Whitley Committee Report to Parliament in 1914. In the United States, although
work councils were encouraged under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, they were declared illegal in the first ruling of
the NLRB 4 as interferences with the representation rights of unions. Codetermination, on the other hand, is the participation of
employee representatives in the highest levels of managerial policy
making through membership on boards of directors. Codetermination was first established in Europe in the coal and steel industries
of Germany. It was introduced there shortly after World War II by
the British, in whose occupation zone these industries were located, as a means to prevent a resurgence of Nazism. The system
was made permanent in 1951 by legislation. In the following year
legislation applied a modified version of codetermination to all
German industry." In the coal and steel companies, labor holds
half the seats on the supervisory boards (parity), whereas in the
other industries labor representatives hold one-third of the places.
The concept of codetermination is gaining increasing support in
other countries of the EC 0 and, as discussed below, is a major
feature of the EC move toward the establishment of "European
companies." American labor's lack of interest in participation in
management and the increasing pressure of Western European
labor toward codetermination present an interesting paradox. The
United States is the only nation in which a strong system of organized labor has accepted capitalism, almost without question, as the
appropriate form of economic organization. In varying degrees,
unions elsewhere espouse real (or doctrinaire) opposition to the
capitalist system. Nevertheless, the European unions have pushed
for partnership in decision making with the capitalist "enemies."
The European movement toward codetermination offers a more
viable means for European labor to influence Europe-based MNCs
than does the prospect of international collective bargaining. Even
24. Fairweather, Trends in InternationalCollectiveBargainingwith Multinationals and the Respective Strategies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL WINTER MEETINGS 152 (Industrial Relations Research Association 1974).
25. See Windmuller, German CodeterminationLaw, 6 IND. & LAB. REL. REv.
404 (1953); W.

BLUMENTHAL, CODETERMINATION IN THE GERMAN STEEL INDUSTRY

(1956).
26. See, e.g.,

PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT: INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN THREE

WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

(W: Albeda ed. 1973).

MULTINATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

Winter 1977]

if international collective bargaining became a reality, it might be
difficult to use it to affect the investment and production policies
of MNCs, which encompass unions' greatest concerns for employment opportunities. In contrast, investment and production policies are fundamental concerns of corporate boards of directors.
Labor representation on these boards gives unions direct participation in decision making by parent corporations in these vital areas.
VI.

UNION RESPONSES TO THE

MNCs

The increasing importance of MNCs has evoked various union
responses, which can be divided into two general categories-international efforts and home-country efforts. In the former,
existing international union structures have provided the initiative
and the means by which unions of the various countries in which
a MNC operates have sought to deal with that enterprise on an
international basis. Home-country efforts, which have, as yet, been
of lesser significance, involve attempts by home-country unions to
restrict MNCs through domestic legislation or through bargaining
with their parent organizations.
A. InternationalEfforts
Since World War II, international trade union structures have
experienced a "proliferation bordering on chaos" of "organizations
of varied purposes, levels, and ideological orientation. ' 2 7 The three
global internationals are as follows: the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the World Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU), and the much smaller International Federation
of Christian Trade Unions. The ICFTU was formed in 1949 by a
group of unions that had been unable to neutralize the domination
of the WFTU by Communist unions under Russian leadership.
Because the vast majority of WFTU members are now from Communist bloc countries, only the ICFTU will concern us here.
The ICFTU has both regional and industrial affiliates. Its regional subdivisions, which enjoy varying degrees of independence,
are concerned with Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe. The
ICFTU encompasses eighteen industrial internationals known as
International Trade Secretariats (ITSs). Whereas the membership
in the global and regional internationals is mainly national trade
27. Windmuller, InternationalTrade Union Organizations:Structure, Functions, Limitations, in Barkin, supra note 13, at 81.
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union federations, membership in the ITSs consists of individual
national unions identified with a particular industry or trade.
While the ITSs accept the right of the ICFTU to "formulate the
guiding principles on major political and economic issues," the
autonomy and integrity of the eighteen ITSs is explicitly acknowledged by the ICFTU.2 8
The ineffectiveness of international union structures was characterized in 1967 by Windmuller as follows:
By comparison with most national organizations, international organizations are as a rule poorly provided with those instruments
that are essential to effective action, in particular a well-functioning
apparatus under authoritative leadership, adequate human and
material resources, and certain devices for inducing or compelling
adherence to their policies. In general, their secretariats are weak,
their resources scanty, and their coercive and persuasive powers
exceedingly small. 9
Since that time a few of the ITSs have made serious efforts to
deal with MNCs in their jurisdictions. Most prominent among
them are the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF), the
largest and one of the oldest ITSs, the International Federation of
Chemical and General Workers' Unions (ICF), the International
Union of Feed, Drink and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF), and
the Postal, Telephone and Telegraph International (PTTI), all of
which are based in Geneva, Switzerland, where they operate with
tiny staffs and budgets. These ITSs sponsor world councils or departments for particular industries under their respective jurisdictions, such as the automotive, electrical equipment manufacturing, oil, chemical and rubber industries. World councils are often
subdivided further into world company councils, each of which is
concerned with the world-wide operations of a particular MNC. In
dealing with MNCs the IMF is the most developed of the ITSs. Its
automotive department incorporates separate world company
councils for General Motors, Ford, Chrysler-Fiat-Simca-Rootes,
and Volkswagen-Daimler-Benz. The initiative and major support
for the founding of these particular world company councils in 1966
came from the United Automobile Workers of America (UAW) and
its president, Walter P. Reuther.
The UAW's interest was the same as that of other American
unions which have pressed for world-wide action against MNCs.
28. Id. at 86.
29. Id. at 97.
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Unions, especially in the United States, are increasingly concerned
over the loss of jobs in their countries through the shifting of production by the MNCs to other lower-wage countries and the related phenomenon of "world-wide sourcing," the specialization of
the production of components in those countries where they can be
produced for lowest cost. Thus, General Motors might assemble in
several countries (including the United States) an automobile with
an engine from Germany, a transmission from the United Kingdom, axles from France, a carburetor from the Netherlands, a
frame from Italy, and a body from Belgium. At least partial worldwide sourcing is a reality for many MNCs. Economic realities and
the technological and organizational flexibilities enjoyed by MNCs
suggest that world-wide sourcing will continue to increase in importance.
A related fear of unions is that their economic power in dealing
with a MNC in any one country is becoming seriously diluted
through the international dispersion of production. This not only
reduces the impact of any particular strike, but also, as discussed
above, makes it possible for the MNC to import its overseas production to maintain its sales in a country in which its production
has been interrupted by a strike.
In 1966, in Detroit, delegates representing unions in fourteen
countries issued the Founding Declaration of the world company
councils for the American Big Three automobile companies. The
Declaration reviews the dangers to workers arising from the increasing multinational power of these corporations and their policies of world-wide sourcing and, then, sets forth the goals of the
councils as follows:
Without neglecting the specially urgent problems that exist in specific countries and companies, we agree upon the need for coordinated worldwide concentration by the IMF affiliated organizations
upon these problems that are of high priority:
-Full recognition of the right to organize, bargain collectively on
wages, working conditions and social benefits and negotiate grievances.
-Upward harmonization of wages and social benefits to the maximum extent permitted by the technological development of the industry in each country.
-Humanize the industrial process by the immediate establishment
of adequate and paid relief time and rest periods.
-An end to excessive overtime work and the guarantee of adequate
premium pay for such overtime as can be justified.
-Adequate implementation throughout the world of the vacation
bonus principle already conceded by the Big Three in certain countries.
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-Pensions sufficient to assure the security and dignity of workers
who are too old to work and too young to die.
-Guaranteed income for workers affected by production fluctuations or technological change.
-Reduction of working time through a compensated shorter work
week, more paid holidays, longer vacations, and early retirement, in
the light of technological progress and the increased dehumanization of industrial employment.
With our growing power through the IMF that can equal even the
giant strength of the corporations we shall intensify our efforts to
coordinate and to apply our combined resources in support of our
common goals."
Subsequent declarations and actions of the IMF and other ITSs
have sought more explicitly to achieve such ends through multinational collective bargaining. Thus far, however, their actual accomplishments have been much more modest, limited mainly to
information activities, resolutions for boycotts, refusals to work
overtime in support of strikes in other countries, and declarations
of solidarity. An example involving such cooperation is the long
strike, beginning on April 21, 1976, by the United Rubber Workers
against four American rubber companies. The AFL-CIO News re-

ported as follows:
International support of the boycott came at a two-day strategy
meeting held by URW President Peter Bommarito and representatives of foreign trade unions in Geneva, under the auspices of the
ICF, the trade secretariat to which the Rubber Workers belong.
After a first-hand report on the bargaining situation from Bommarito, the delegates agreed on a "solidarity action" plan by their
unions at the Big Four's overseas facilities.
The agreement calls for a ban on overtime work at plants of all
four struck companies to offset the production loss caused by the
American strike. The ICF-affiliated unions also pledged to monitor
their inventories to block any diversion of their output to offset the
loss of production at the U.S. plants.'
A few ITSs have accomplished a great deal in gathering and
disseminating information for national unions to use in dealing
with MNCs in their jurisdictions. Using the computer facilities of
the UAW, the IMF operates a comprehensive and detailed data
system on multinational automobile companies and the provisions

30.

INTERNATIONAL METALWORKERS' FEDERATION, WORLD COMPANY COUNCILS

46 (1967).
31. AFL-CIO News, May 1, 1976, at 2, col. 5.
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of their collective bargaining agreements throughout the world.
Efforts by the ITSs to go beyond information services have met
with little success. Among the stepping stones toward multinational bargaining with a MNC are the attainment of common expiration dates for the collective bargaining agreements in the various
countries in which the MNC operates, the development of the
ability to conduct international sympathy strikes and boycotts,
and the institution of consultation by international unions with
headquarters management. Little has been accomplished in any of
these respects.
Despite claims by ITS leaders of progress toward multinational
bargaining, 32 the scholarly evidence on the subject includes little
basis for such claims. Duane Kujawa's detailed study of the automotive Big Three states:
There is little or no appreciable influence on labor relations at the
European subsidiaries visited which could be assigned to activities
originated by either the UAW or the IMF ....
Moreover, an effective international labor movement is not to be expected in the near
future. Diverse national labor union interests, legally determined
collective bargaining structures on a national or regional basis, cultural variations, dissimilar product markets, local labor markets,
and so on are all impediments to the evolution and meaningful
operation of an international labor movement directly concerned
with collective bargaining on a multinational scale.3
In a series of recent studies, Herbert Northrup and Richard
Rowan investigate thoroughly the major specific instances in
which each of the four ITSs listed above have claimed that their
efforts have significantly influenced the conduct of MNCs. Their
investigations were based on published information, documents,
correspondence, and interviews with key persons. Most of the
major instances they studied involved European-based firms such
as Saint-Gobain, Dunlop-Pirelli, AKZO, Michelin, and Solvay
with the ICF,34 Nestle and Unilever with the IUF,15 and Cable and
32. See, e.g., Janssen, How One Man Helps Unions Match Wits with Multinationals, Wall St. J., June 17, 1974, at 1, col. 1; C. LEviNSON, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE UNIONISM (1972).
33. D. KUJAWA, supra note 11, at 211.
34. Northrup & Rowan, Multinational Collective BargainingActivity: The
Factual Record in Chemicals, Glass, and Rubber Tires, (pts. 1-2), 1974 COLUM.
J. WORLD Bus. 112.
35. Northrup & Rowan, MultinationalBargainingin Food and Allied Industries: Approaches and Prospects, 1974 WHARTON Q. 33.
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Wireless, Ltd. with the PTTI.3 Only under IMF jurisdiction did
their major instances include American-based MNCs-Ford, General Electric, and Honeywell. The metalworkers' jurisdiction also
included major instances involving European-based MNCsBrown Boveri, Philips, and Fokker-VFW. The last two of these
firms involved the European Metalworkers' Federation (described
below), rather than the IMF."
The IMF's efforts with Ford exemplify the almost universal frustration of union attempts to influence MNCs on the international
level. In 1966, at the request of the IMF, Ford held a transnational
meeting with union representatives from seven countries. Even the
IMF noted, however, that this was not a collective bargaining session, but rather an opportunity for delegates to make serious problems known to top management." In 1972 an IMF European Regional Meeting of Ford workers pressed unsuccessfully for a
Europe-wide conference with the company. In turning down the
requested meeting the company indicated that it felt that no useful
purpose would be served because of the national differences in
labor laws and bargaining procedures, and in the local decisionmaking power in labor relations. Under pressure from the UAW,
the company met in Detroit in 1973 with a delegation of UAW
and IMF representatives. At this meeting the company reiterated
its position that national differences made inter-country meetings
inadvisable.
The company agreed to consider all points raised and indicated that
if any reply were made it would be through the UAW. It seems clear
that although the company had agreed to meet with a joint UAWIMF delegation, it was being quite cautious about extending recognition to IMF. It is likely that both in the 1966 and 1973 meetings
the company
was responding especially to pressures from the
UAW. 3 9
In view of the pervasiveness of MNCs, their large numbers, and
the impact their activities have on the world and, especially, on
their workers, there have been relatively few instances in which it
has been alleged that international union efforts have influenced
36. Rowan & Northrup, MultinationalBargainingin the Telecommunications
Industry, 13 BRrr. J. INDUS. REL. 257 (1975).

37. Rowan & Northrup, Multinational Bargaining in Metals and Electrical
Industries:Approaches and Prospects, 1975 J. INDUS. REL. 1.
38. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 8, at 58.
39.

Id. at 59.
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MNC activities. Even in the instances identified, the intensive
investigations by Northrup and Rowan found very little factual
basis for most of the claims. Their summarization of the situation
in the automotive industry characterizes their findings in the other
industries:
As of this writing, the I.M.F. and its constituent bodies in the automotive industry have moved toward multinational co-ordination of
bargaining only by exchanging information and increasing somewhat the commonality of some demands put forward in separate
local or national bargaining negotiations. Even here, demands
maintain an overwhelming national flavour. Attempts to develop
common contract termination dates, to influence national wage policy, or to engage in meaningful discussions with companies on a
multinational basis, have been largely unsuccessful. 0
The situation is complicated further by the appearance of other
international trade union organizations related to the EC. Soon
after the EC Treaty was signed in 1957, unions in the member
countries established liaison offices in Brussels, the seat of the EC.
In 1973, the unions in the newly expanded EC formed the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), which has no formal
relationship with either the ICFTU or its ITSs. The ETUC has
been the unifying force for EC unions and, according to Rowan and
Northrup, "represents a strong movement toward regional unity
but international separatism."4 Affiliated with the ETUC are several industry groupings of unions of EC countries. Foremost among
them is the European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF). The EMF
is not affiliated with the IMF. Rowan and Northrup state that the
"E.M.F. has been quite persistent in its avowed aim of pushing key
European multinational concerns toward multibargaining arrangements. ' 4 2 They describe a series of meetings, beginning in

1967, with Philips headquarters management and a series of meetings, beginning in 1970, with the top management of Fokker-VFW.
Although the EMF might regard these as significant steps toward
multinational bargaining, the companies regarded both discontinued series of meetings as informational only and insisted that bargaining relationships be at national levels.43
40. Rowan & Northrup, supra note 37, at 10.
41. Id. at 23.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26-27. For the EMF version of these discussions and related matters,
see the chapter by its Secretary, Gunter Kopke, MultinationalCorporationsand
InternationalUnions: The Viewpoints and Responses of Continental European
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For both conceptual and practical reasons, international unions
have accomplished very little in their efforts to bring about multinational bargaining. Their efforts confront (1) the fundamental
differences in the legal and institutional environments of the various national systems of industrial relations, (2) the almost universal refusal of the managements of MNCs to bargain multinationally with unions, and (3) the basic differences in the interests of
the array of disparate unions that deal with the same MNCs. How
could these national unions, even in coalition, agree on a common
multinational bargaining position on the investment policies of a
MNC when the decision to build or expand facilities in one of
their countries would clearly benefit workers there, but might
seriously disadvantage workers in other countries? It is hard to
imagine Italiaif workers supporting UAW opposition to a major
investment in Italy as part of world-wide sourcing for assembly
operations in the United States. The absence of union security
arrangements in the EC countries means that members there can
easily leave their unions over unpopular policies. Accordingly, it is
difficult to believe that European unions could, even if they
wanted, rally the necessary support for such multinational causes
that are remote from, and perhaps inimical to, the workplace
concerns of their members. The importance of the individual
interests of union members and, especially, the national interests
of their unions argues strongly against the ability of unions to
formulate a common international stance on the matter of greatest
importance regarding a MNC-its investment policies. Although
some students of the subject are cautiously sanguine about the
prospects of multinational bargaining, 4 others, including this
writer, are considerably less so.45
B. Domestic Efforts
The second main category of union response consists of efforts
of unions in the home country of the MNC, which in most cases is
the United States. Because American unions are not members of
the EC-related international union bodies, such as the EMF, the
Union, in Flanagan & Weber, supra note 9, at 203.
44. See, e.g., Ulman, The Rise of the International Union?, in Flanagan &
Weber, supra note 9, at 37.
45. See, e.g., Ruttenberg, The Union View of Multinationals:An Interpretation, in Flanagan & Weber, supra note 9, at 179; Denise, supra note 9, at 135;
Curtin, supra note 13, at 192.
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potential of European union groups for broadly based multinational dealings with American-based MNCs is necessarily severely
limited. If they succeed in dealing with such firms in Europe, it
will likely be as antagonists to, rather than as partners with, their
American union counterparts.
In spite of American union support for the ITS, union spokesmen
are showing considerable disenchantment with international
collective bargaining and domestic legislation as the key to controlling MNCs. 6 This is exemplified by the massive labor support
for the Burke-Hartke bill (The Foreign Trade and Investment Act
of 1973), which would extend and intensify import quota restrictions, substantially increase the tax liability of MNCs, and prohibit investments abroad that would decrease employment in the
United States. The bill would impose quotas, on a country-bycountry basis, on all imports not now subject to quantitative import restrictions. These quotas could be raised or lowered to maintain a base-period ratio of imports to domestic production or to
meet special situations. For example, quotas would be reduced in
response to a finding that imports are "inhibiting the production
of any manufactured product." The bill would concentrate power
over trade matters in the hands of a new three-member Foreign
Trade and Investment Commission, consisting of spokesmen for
industry, labor, and the public, who would have six-year staggered
terms.
The bill would make substantial changes in the treatment of
United States direct foreign investments. It would tax the profits
of United States corporate foreign subsidiaries in the year in which
they were earned. This would remove the present substantial incentive to reinvest foreign earnings abroad that results from the
current tax liability only on repatriated earnings. The bill would
repeal the federal tax credit now allowed United States companies
for payment of foreign income taxes. It would also delete sections
806:30 and 807 of the United States Tariff Schedules, which permit
United States firms shipping goods abroad for further processing
to pay duties only on the value added abroad for products reentering the United States. The bill also contains important direct controls of foreign investment. It would authorize the President to
prohibit any transfer of United States capital abroad whenever, in
his judgment, the transfer would result in a net decrease in United
States employment. The President could also prohibit any holder
46.

See, e.g., Ruttenberg, supra note 45.
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of a United States patent from manufacturing the patented item
abroad, or licensing its use outside the United States, when he
judged that such a prohibition would increase United States employment.
Passage of the Burke-Hartke bill would remove the major advantages that overseas investments now offer to United States-based
MNCs. In combination with the power of direct prohibitions over
the export of capital and technology, it would effectively answer
the fears of United States labor concerning the export of jobs. Not
surprisingly, the bill has evoked spirited and effective opposition
from the business community. Although there seems to be little
likelihood for passage of this bill, it has been the focus of recent
American union efforts to regulate MNCs.
Strong United States union support of domestic legislation
which would restrict MNCs poses some interesting paradoxes.
American unions are unique among the world's unions in their very
strong preference for attaining their goals through collective bargaining rather than through political action. Nevertheless, despite
the leadership of some of them in union activities on an international scale, American unions have increasingly elected the domestic political route in limiting MNCs. That election undoubtedly
reduces the effectiveness of United States union leadership in the
international councils of unions. The efforts by American unions
to stifle, through Burke-Hartke, the overseas investments of
United States MNCs conflicts directly with the interests of foreign
unions by reducing employment opportunities in their jurisdictions.
It seems to this writer that the focus of United States labor on
legislation as restrictive as Burke-Hartke is not only misplaced,
but also inimical to a much more promising course by which American unions might influence MNCs. In many of the industries in
which foreign operations are of greatest concern to United States
labor, such as the automotive and consumer electronics industries,
collective bargaining in the United States takes place at the corporate level-that is, with the parent organizations of the MNCs.
American unions have amply proved their ability and inventiveness in bargaining over a wide range of issues. The existing forum
of collective bargaining with the parent organizations might offer
a more viable means for influencing MNCs than any other means
in reasonable prospect. One conceptual barrier is that the matters
of greatest interest to United States unions, international investment and production policies, are areas whose domestic counterparts have been largely unaffected by collective bargaining. Al-

Winter 1977]

MULTINATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

though there appears to be a very limited legal basis for any employer obligation to bargain on overseas investments,47 powerful
and ingenious unions might be able to press their international
interests effectively in domestic collective bargaining with parent
organizations.
VII.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The present diverse legal and institutional structures of the EC
countries limit the prospects for multinational bargaining. These
impediments could, however, be removed through contemplated
major changes in those structures. Such fundamental changes are,
indeed, the objective of the EC work toward "harmonization" of
social (including industrial relations) policies among the member
nations. The Treaty of Rome states these goals in articles 117 and
118 as follows:
Article 117
Member States hereby agree upon the necessity to promote improvement of the living and working conditions of labour so as to
permit the equalization of such conditions in an upward direction.
They consider that such a development will result not only from
the functioning of the Common Market which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the procedures provided
for under this Treaty and from the approximation of legislative and
adminstrative provisions.
Article 118

Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and in
conformity with its general objectives, it shall be the aim of the
Commission to promote close collaboration between Member States
in the the social field, particularly in matters relating to:
-employment,
-occupational and continuation training,
-social security,
-protection against occupational accidents and diseases,
-industrial hygiene,
-the law as to trade union, and collective bargaining between employers and workers.
47. See Kujawa, Foreign Sourcing Decisions and the Duty to Bargain Under
the NLRA, in Kujawa, supra note 13, at 223.
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For this purpose, the Commission shall act in close contact with

Member States by means of studies, the issuing of opinions, and the
organising of consultations both on problems arising at the national
level and on those of concern to international oranizations.
Before issuing the opinions provided for under this Article, the
Commission shall consult the Economic and Social Committee."
The aspirations of the EC with respect to unionism and collective bargaining on an EC-wide basis were well stated by its former
(1963-1968) Director-General of Social Affairs, J.D. Neirinck:
The time has come, in my view, for the labor and employers' organizations to advance beyond mere service as liaison bodies and secretariats and with courage and resolution to tackle the problem of
setting up a European center and transferring to this organization
some of the powers of the national organizations, thus making a
start on effective trade union integration. The labor movement's
powers and its role in the Community will then become very different."
The Commission hopes that the provision of well-presented comparative statistics and technical assistance will stimulate developments that might eventually result in various forms of collective
bargaining at Community level.w
Despite such high hopes it proved impossible to secure agreement, even among the organizations of member countries, on setting up a central EC records office for the registration of the major
5 1
provisions of collective bargaining agreements in those countries.
The annual reports of the EC reflect the high hopes and bleak
prospects for the stimulation of EC-wide collective bargaining. For
example, point 236 of the 1974 Report states:
In spite of the Commission's efforts to set up new joint committees
whose work would facilitate the conclusions of European collective
agreements, it is proving difficult to achieve rapid results. Respect
for the autonomy of the two sides of industry and the confused
situations arising when sectoral regroupings take place at European
level, both on the workers' side and on the employers' side, are liable
48. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 27, 1957,
[1973]
49.
50.
51.

Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (CmD. No. 5179-110), 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
Neirinck, Social Policy of the EEC, in Kamin, supra note 13, at 48.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 42.
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to delay the setting up of a broader system of sectoral relations
52

Harmonization in this area has remained a dream, as it has in
most other areas of EC concern:
The 1980 deadline for "European union," set by the Paris summit
of 1972, had become a joke by the end of 1973. The Copenhagen
summit agreement on immediate formation of energy and regional
policies disintegrated within three days. Deadlines set at Paris for
integration in social, scientific, industrial and other areas came and
went with no action. 3
The dim prospects for a united Europe were underscored by the
1975 report by former EC Commission Vice-President Robert Marjolin, whose verdict is reported as follows:
. . . all attempts so far to achieve economic and monetary union
had failed and. . . the Community was less united now than it had
been two years ago. Marjolin . . . concluded that the old Monnet
strategy of unity through stealth-the theory that many acts of
cooperation, piled on top of each other, would suddenly produce a
united Europe one fine day-had simply not worked and would not
work. Marjolin said that only an exercise of political will would
achieve unity. This will, he said, does not exist now. Until it does,
it is useless to plot grand designs for future unity. He advised the
Nine to forget about such designs for the moment and to work instead at recapturing the habit of cooperation. There would be time
later, he said, to set grandiose goals.54
Despite the remote prospects for Europe-wide collective bargaining through economic unity or through the harmonization of industrial relations policies, a separate but related development-the proposed European company statutes (ECS)-has
important implications for MNCs operating there. In April 1975,
after almost five years of discussion and modification, the EC
Commission presented to the Council of Ministers for consideration the final draft of the ECS, which consists of 284 articles and
approximately 800 pages. If approved, the ECS would allow companies (including American subsidiaries) doing business in at least
52.
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two EC countries the option of registering as "European companies" under the statute rather than registering under existing national laws. The statute would allow firms to elect to operate
throughout the EC as one economic entity, thereby escaping the
many restrictions which different national incorporation laws impose on their ability to conduct transnational business.
The requirements to be met before a company could register as
"European" include its acceptance of codetermination. The
strengthening of the codetermination requirement in the original
1970 proposal was the subject of most of the intervening discussions, which included among those groups consulted all major
union and employer organizations. 6 Union pressure changed the
original proposal of two-thirds shareholder representation on supervisory boards to the present provision allowing them to elect,
by a two-thirds majority, the remaining one-third from
"independents," who can be neither shareholders nor employees.
Although this provision falls short of the general union preference for parity, it would, nevertheless, incorporate considerable
labor power into management decision making. This has been evident in Germany, the only EC country in which codetermination
is now a reality. The power over the investment decisions of MNCs
that can be exercised by worker participation in management is
illustrated by Volkswagen's May 1976 decision to establish an assembly plant in the United States, after a long history of efforts
to do so over the opposition of its home-country union:
Mr. Loderer's union has just consented to Volkswagen setting
up an assembly plant in the United States, but only after the company had modified its original plans and had given far-reaching
guarantees for future employment in Germany-guarantees which
critics say go far beyond what industry should reasonably concede.
In what Mr. Loderer termed a "decision of true multinational character," the union members on Volkswagen's supervisory board (he
is one) had made sure that the company could not expand the proposed assembly plant in America into a fully integrated factor without coming back for further discussion. Volkswagen will not be allowed to re-export American-assembled Rabbits (i.e., Golfs) to Europe, and the production of other models across the Atlantic will
need new approval by the supervisory board."
56. Id.
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MULTINATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

The available evidence contains little support for the widely held
view that multinational collective bargaining is inevitable. The
evidence presented, largely by union spokesmen, to prove that a
trend toward multinational bargaining is under way does not stand
up under scrutiny. Although a few MNCs have agreed to informal
and carefully circumscribed discussions with international groupings of unions, these discussions have not yet been meaningful
opening wedges for international collective bargaining. In the absence of any supra-national legal compulsion to deal internationally with unions, managements have been free to refuse to enter
into even such informal discussions. The exercise of this management prerogative has effectively stifled union efforts. In the relatively few instances in which MNCs have agreed to informal discussions, they have terminated them at will. Only real power by
unions on an international scale could, given present institutions,
propel MNCs toward multinational collective bargaining. Such
power is not in prospect primarily because of irreconcilable conflicts of national interests concerning the investment and production policies of MNCs.
Under some unlikely future circumstances, MNCs might conceivably reverse their policies of stalwart opposition to multinational collective bargaining. Even with the major imminent barrier
thus removed, it seems very unlikely that meaningful multinational collective bargaining would take place even if the MNCs
were to encourage it. It would be almost impossible for unions to
achieve the international cooperation essential to multinational
bargaining because of the profound and irreconcilable differences
in their interests as representatives of the highly differential needs
of their members in their own countries. Regarding fundamental
questions of the investment policies of MNCs and efforts to equalize wages and benefits among the constituent unions, the interests
of the members, on a national basis, would often be so seriously
opposed that enduring cooperation among the national unions
would be rendered almost impossible.
Although national differences among the EC countries could be
significantly reduced by progress toward harmonization of social
policies, very little such progress has taken place or is in prospect.
If "European companies" become a reality, it is probable that
most American MNCs will not elect to constitute themselves in
that fashion because of the high price: the acceptance of codetermination-an alien and frightening prospect for most American
managements. If harmonization were to take place, or if American-
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based MNCs did elect to become "European companies," it seems
much more likely that European union interests and efforts would
compete with, rather than cooperate with, those of their American
counterparts. Accordingly, even if such remote possibilities were to
develop, multinational collective bargaining without the active
involvement of American unions would be quite different from that
envisaged by its proponents.
Unless and until there is a harmonization of social policies in the
EC that allows multinational bargaining (probably without the
participation of United States unions), European and United
States unions can deal with MNCs most effectively through activities within their own countries. These activities would be most
effective if patterned after those which unions in Europe and the
United States have used most effectively over the years. For European unions the best method is political action, rather than collective bargaining, which has predominated for United States unions.
European unions would probably be most successful by continuing
their promising efforts to achieve codetermination, such as that
which now exists in Germany. They could, thereby, share with
managements of Europe-based MNCs decision-making power on
investment, production, and all other policies of importance to
them.
American unions have no such role in prospect. Furthermore,
their political efforts to secure stringent restrictions on MNCs
through legislation have not been, and are not likely to be, effective. Their most effective potential leverage on United Statesbased MNCs is their established collective bargaining relationships with the parent corporations, with whom they already deal
on a wide range of domestic industrial relations matters. The extension of domestic collective bargaining with the parent corporations into matters of international investment and production policies that effect American employment opportunities seems well
within the power of many of the American unions most concerned
about the threat posed by MNCs.

